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Abstract 
The concept of face, as it is developed by Goffman, has strong conceptual links with 
the notion of a ‘looking-glass’ self outlined by Adam Smith and developed 
sociologically by Cooley. It also has links with the Chinese concept of face, which 
relates to the transfer of social science concepts from one cultural setting to another. 
By discussing the specificity and universality of face the paper indicates the 
significance of the Chinese concept of face in a global sociology.  The paper goes on 
to examine aspects of the treatment of the Chinese concept of face and in doing so 
presents a more comprehensive account of a sociological conceptualisation of face. 
The paper then considers the relationship between face and emotions in indicating the 
mechanisms that underlie face. Finally, a distinction is made between face as an 
embedded social process and as an object of social contestation.  
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FACE: A CHINESE CONCEPT IN A GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 The question of the mobility of social science concepts from one cultural 
setting to another has recently been raised as a matter of significance for the 
development of social science ‘on a world scale’ (Connell 2007). The application of 
concepts drawn from non-Western experience and social theory in the development of 
a ‘global’ social science raises questions concerning the capacity of ‘local’ concepts 
to provide explanations of non-local, even universal phenomena. An early and 
unrecognised instance of such a development is Goffman’s now classic elaboration of 
the concept of face. While not highlighting his reliance on the Chinese conception of 
face, which he nevertheless acknowledges in a footnote at the beginning of his 
discussion (Goffman 1972: 5-6 footnote 1), Goffman’s argument is therefore an 
instance of the benefits of cross-cultural borrowing in achievement of theoretical 
development.  
 The present paper shows that sociological analysis of the concept of face can 
continue to benefit from discussion of Chinese distinctions and conceptualisations. 
This is because while face is indeed a universal phenomenon, namely the social 
anchoring of self in the gaze of others, the Chinese experience of face highlights 
aspects of face that are less visible in non-Chinese societies. The notion of face is 
therefore appropriate in demonstrating the benefits, indeed, intellectual necessity 
under conditions of globalisation, of incorporating non-Western concepts into 
mainstream theorizing in generation of a global social science. The importance of face 
in modestly contributing to this development derives from its elemental role in human 
sociality in general, and at the same time its high salience in Chinese society in 
particular. In demonstrating the value of drawing on Chinese experience and 
understanding of face in elaborating a concept basic to Western social science (as we 
shall see in Smith and Cooley as well as Goffman) the remote and exotic becomes 
familiar, and cultural distance is bridged in social science understanding that therefore 
ceases to be either Western or Eastern but is now shared. 
 In the discussion to follow it is shown that while there may be specific and 
distinct cultural elements which determine different aspects of face and while the 
rules according to which face operates may vary, the imperatives of a self-awareness 
of social evaluation is universal. In examining treatments of the Chinese concept of 
face it will be shown that differences between two terms, lian and mianzi, both of 
which mean face, raise issues of the distinction between different contextual 
consideration of face, including its moral and social aspects. Through further 
discussion of additional distinctions within the concept the paper goes on to provide 
an account of face which reflects both its comprehensiveness and dynamics. The 
experience of face generates emotions of various sorts within the individual, which 
are significant in understanding the mechanisms of face. Finally an additional 
dimension of the complexity of face is in the fact that it can function not only as a 
means of social interaction but can become an object of self-conscious consideration 
and intentional management. 
 
The specificity and universality of face 
 Terms such as mianzi (face), guanxi (interdependent relations), renqing 
(reciprocal favour or benefit) and huibao (interdependent obligation), for instance, are 
readily seen to be indicative of characteristically indigenous Chinese socio-cultural 
 phenomena, in the sense that they uniquely derive from the Chinese historical 
experience. It is widely accepted, as Buckley, Clegg and Tan (2006: 276) indicate, 
that ‘[t]he need for mianzi is intrinsic to various aspects of personal and interpersonal 
relationship development in China’. Mianzi or face is an inevitable and unavoidable 
aspect of interpersonal encounters, connections and relationships in almost every 
aspect of social life in China, ranging from informal personal interactions to the most 
ordered and formal elements of organisational and institutional relationships. It is one 
of the keys in understanding Chinese politics, economics, business, and education at 
every level. Hence: ‘[n]early all Chinese and Western researchers identify face as a 
major dimension of Chinese culture’ (Cardon and Scott 2003: 9).  
 Face, in the sense presented here, even as a term which is original to Chinese 
culture, cannot be seen as an exclusively Chinese phenomenon: ‘concern for face is 
not solely an “Asian” phenomenon, as it is found in individuals from all societies and 
ethnic groups’ (Lau and Wong 2008: 52). Brown and Levinson (1987: 62) similarly 
argue that ‘the mutual knowledge of [a person’s] public self-image or face, and the 
social necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction, are universal’. The insight that 
individuals, irrespective of their cultural background, cannot disregard the opinions or 
appraisals of others in their own self-understanding, led Goffman (1972: 44) to 
remark that ‘underneath their differences in culture, people everywhere are the 
same … [in the sense that one] is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to 
self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honour, and dignity, to have 
considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise’. Through their social 
relationships individuals seek the approval or respect of others and typically desire to 
achieve a position of approbation in the social group to which they belong.  
The universality of face is widely acknowledged. Zhu (2003: 316), for 
instance, says: ‘people, despite their various cultural backgrounds, are believed to 
possess self-image/value and want their self-image/value to be appreciated and 
respected by other members of the community’. This point is reinforced by Hwang et 
al (2003: 74) when they describe face as ‘an important pancultural construct to 
explain the desire for social acceptance’. Ho (1976: 883) similarly argues that face 
should be regarded as a concept of central importance in sociology '‘because of the 
pervasiveness with which it asserts its influence in social intercourse, it is virtually 
impossible to think of a facet of social life to which the question of face is irrelevant’. 
The consensus of a number of writers, from a broad social science background, holds 
that face includes a socially formed self-image that is essential to the dynamics of the 
individual’s relations with others regardless of their cultural background or national 
context. The qualification, that while face itself is universal, features important to it in 
any particular culture may not be general across them all (Ho 1976: 881-2), shall be 
considered below. 
 In considering the universality of face it is relevant to mention that the word 
‘face’ may be absent even when the concept is discussed or applied. The term 
‘looking glass’ self, developed by the 18th century Scottish thinker Adam Smith, 
captures the details of the relationships of face outlined above: 
We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to 
imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only 
looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other 
people, scrutinise the propriety of our own conduct. If in this view it pleases us, 
we are tolerably satisfied… if we are doubtful about it, we are often, upon that 
very account, more anxious to gain their approbation, and … we are altogether 
 distracted at the thoughts of their censure, which then strikes us with double 
severity (Smith quoted in Barbalet 2001: 108). 
By imagining how they are seen by others individuals are directed in their behaviour 
by a self image or face that comes out of their social relations.  
A person may not know or be aware of their dependence on the opinion of 
others, on the importance of face in their own self-image and behaviour, a particularly 
relevant consideration for understanding face in individualistic cultures in which 
persons believe themselves to be self-sufficient and autonomous. The point has been 
made by Cooley, who also uses the term ‘the reflected or looking glass self’ (Cooley 
1964: 184) and introduced it into modern sociology:   
Many people … will deny, perhaps with indignation, that … care [of what 
others think of them] is an important factor in what they are and do. But this is 
illusion. If failure or disgrace arrives, if one suddenly finds that the faces of 
men show coldness or contempt instead of the kindness and deference that he 
is used to, he will perceive from the shock, the fear, the sense of being outcast 
and helpless, that he was living in the minds of others without knowing it, just 
as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up (Cooley 
1964: 208).  
This ‘outgoing of the imagination towards another person’s point of view’, Cooley 
(1964: 206) observes, ‘means that we are undergoing his influence’. 
While there are differences in the degree to which face is regarded as an object 
of explicit concern that may influence behaviour directly, the underlying processes of 
face – even if a person is not aware of them – are as general as human society itself. 
While being an underlying aspect of all social behaviour, face may also be a distinct 
and distinguishable cultural object in which an explicit concern for face is itself a 
factor in motivating the actions and influencing the behaviour of individuals. In this 
case a set of culturally explicit rules will operate by which face is understood as a 
thing that may be achieved, lost, saved and in any event is required to be at least 
maintained. Such rules, and the considerations and distinctions they draw upon, 
arguably indicate aspects of the more universal mechanisms of face. In the next 
section aspects of the Chinese treatment of face will be discussed in order to prefigure 
features of face which are broader than the particularly Chinese experience of face.  
 
Distinctions within the concept of face 
In a pioneering anthropological account of the ‘Chinese concept face’ the 
distinction between two Chinese words which both mean face, lian and mianzi, is 
explored (Hu 1944)¹.  We shall see that the distinction between these words raises a 
number of relevant concerns for an understanding of face in general, and the impact 
of face on self formation and social relations. 
The idea that the Chinese concept of face can be regarded as having two 
component parts, one moral (covered by the term lian) and the other social (covered 
by the term mianzi), corresponds to this linguistic distinction. Lian is defined by Hu 
(1944: 45) as ‘respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation … it 
represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego’s moral character, the loss 
of which make it impossible for him to function properly within the community’. 
Mianzi, as distinct from lian, according to Hu (1944: 45), ‘stands for the kind of 
prestige … [of] a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and 
ostentation … For this kind of recognition ego is dependent at all times on his 
external environment’.  
 The differentiation of lian and mianzi, representing moral and social aspects of 
face respectively, is not confined to Hu’s account. Earley (1997: 56), for instance, 
defines ‘lian as a set of rules for moral conduct and mianzi as a person’s position 
within a social structure … lian reflects the enactment of “correct” behaviour, 
whereas mianzi reflects an outcome state of social interaction’.  But the distinction 
between moral and social aspects of face, which is not without significance, cannot 
rest on this linguistic division: the concept of lian in fact is not limited to moral 
connotation and mianzi does not necessarily exclude a moral sense. Mianzi, Ho (1976: 
868) says, is ‘not altogether devoid of moral content’ and the two terms, lian and 
mianzi, ‘are not completely differentiated from each other in that the terms are 
interchangeable in some contexts’. Even in the examples given by Hu, lian may be 
devoid of a moral aspect, as when a lecturer is unable to answer students’ questions,  
he then will have ‘his incapability … proven and his lien [lian] lost’ (Hu 1944: 48). 
At the same time Hu (1944: 57) provides an example of mianzi which shows that it 
may have moral implications: ‘[e]verybody knows that X is incapable of holding that 
job. But of course, he and so-and-so were schoolmates, so so-and-so wanted to give 
him some mien-tzu [mianzi]’. Even if Hu believes that an incompetent’s achieving a 
position of employment through nepotism is without moral relevance, X’s 
employment in a job everyone knows he is incapable of holding is not merely social 
positional. 
Indeed, the case for a simple dichotomy between lian as moral face and mianzi 
as social face is further weakened by the fact that the concept lian does not have a 
clear cut moral connotation in a number of common Chinese concepts in which lian is 
a part of the expression or term. These include, for instance, such concepts as 
zhanglian (to increase face), shanglian (to give face), fanlian bu renren (total denial 
of relations between previously close friends), da zhonglian chong pangzi 
(falsification of credentials and worth to achieve face), sipo lian (reckless disregard 
for previous good relations), silian (long face, sulky), heilian (bad cop of the ‘good 
cop, bad cop’ couple), honglian (good cop of the ‘good cop, bad cop’ couple), among 
others. If a person believes or feels that he or she has lost lian or does not have lian 
when facing others, it does not necessarily indicate that they have transgressed moral 
standards.  For instance, a person who has failed a university entrance examination 
may be unable to face their parents, teachers and others who had high expectations of 
him or her. While this is not a situation of moral failure it would conventionally be 
described as meilian jian fumu, as a situation in which the person has no face in front 
of parents.  
Another possible way of distinguishing between lian and mianzi is to say that 
the two terms refer to different levels of severity in an incident related to face or to the 
‘amount’ of face a person possesses or has lost or gained. Hsu (1996), for instance, 
suggests that lian may refer to face-relevant situations of great significance or gravity, 
in which moral wrongdoing may then appear to be an important element of the 
situation, whereas mianzi signifies face in less important or more mundane incidents. 
A different approach, however, which also avoids the moral/social distinction of lian 
and mianzi, operates in terms not of the significance of the situation but the sense of 
dignity of the person. According to Cheng (1986: 336): 
The mien-tzu of a person is the uppermost limit of his dignity and social 
respectability whereas lien is … the minimum social respectability a person 
has in the society regardless of his actual social position, prestige, wealth or 
power. 
 The alternative positions set out here, represented by Hsu (1996) and Cheng (1986), 
are not necessarily opposed. When lian relates to the lower limits of respectability 
then the marginal impact of moral transgression will be much higher than it would be 
for mianzi, this latter being the upper limits of dignity and therefore a moral space 
with relatively more latitude than found with lian. What is clear in both Hsu’s and 
Cheng’s account is that lian and mianzi can be distinguished in terms of the gravity of 
the situations which provokes them and not necessarily in the types of values, moral 
or pragmatic and positional, associated with those situations.  
It is worth noting that although she made the distinction between lian and 
mianzi, Hu (1944: 62) recognises that ‘lien [lian] and mien-tzu [mianzi] are not two 
entirely independent concepts’. This is because lian and mianzi can be used 
interchangably in most situations.  For instance, both ‘zhanglian’ and ‘zengjia mianzi’ 
can be used to mean ‘to enhance face’ while ‘shanglian’ and ‘gei mianzi’ may both 
represent ‘to give face’. When referring to a situation of ‘to gain face’, either ‘zheng 
lianmian’ or ‘zheng mianzi’ can be used; ‘to maintain one’s face’, either ‘baochi … 
lianmian’ or ‘baochi…mianzi’ can be used. Both ‘shiqu lianmian’ and ‘shiqu mianzi’ 
can mean ‘to lose face’.  
One possible explanation for the failure in the relevant discussion to find a 
common basis for the differences between lian and mianzi, and indeed for the less 
frequent reference to lian (which has not been of concern here), is that mianzi is a 
more variable term which has more applications, and as a consequence it has become 
the more studied term in academic research. As Cheng (1986: 331-332) notes, ‘lien 
[lian] is a concrete term and a more confined concept than mien [mian], while mien 
can be said to be more general and less concrete but has more meaning content than 
lien. This should explain why mien essentially has more social, moral, civil as well as 
valuational content than lien’. Indeed, my own preference is to use the single term, 
mianzi, while at the same time acknowledging that face has both moral and social 
aspects which are necessarily interrelated and also that there are differences in the 
degree to which experience of the power of face can influence self appraisal and a 
person’s behaviour. 
 
Further distinctions within the concept of face 
 In the English language, in which a singular term for face applies, the explicit 
distinction between lian and mianzi is unknown. And yet, as we shall see, another 
dichotomy emerges, namely the distinction between positive and negative face. 
According to Goffman (1972: 5): 
face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for 
himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. 
Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes.   
While this statement is a useful summary of the concept of face, it may be misleading 
to insist, as Goffman does, that the social value a person claims for himself must be 
positively approved. To say that it is ‘positive’ makes sense in so far as loss of face 
requires a substraction from an existing stock of face, which can be assumed to be a 
positive quantum. But this is not the usual understanding of positive in the context, 
which is rather taken to be a normative evaluation. This is the way in which Goffman 
is usually interpreted and no doubt wished to be understood. For face to be 
meaningful, however, the question is not whether the evaluation is positive in this 
sense but whether it is socially shared or current. And what is socially shared or 
approved at one time in a particular social situation and with regard to a specific 
 social group may be understood quite differently at another time and for a different 
social group. This is not clearly captured in Goffman’s statement.  
The idea that a person’s having face is associated with that person’s ‘positive’ 
self evaluation can be understood not normatively but quantitatively in the sense that 
a loss of face would amount to a subtraction from an existing stock of face. The issue 
of positive evaluation, in this sense, then, relates to a quantitative relationship 
between what a person possesses of face and what is socially given – or taken – 
against the amount of face a person has at any given time. This is what ‘the positive 
social value a person effectively claims for himself’ amounts to and it is how 
Goffman should be understood. 
Difficulty with use of the terms positive and negative in the context of face 
can be indicated further by briefly considering a view of face which its proponents 
claim builds on Goffman’s research. Brown and Levinson (1987: 61-2) say that ‘the 
public self-image that every [social] member wants to claim for himself’ consists of 
two components, negative face and positive face, with negative face as ‘the want of 
every “competent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded by others’ and 
positive as ‘the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some 
others’. Brown and Levinson develop their ‘politeness theory’ of face by relating face 
to its significant role in human communication, in which negative face (‘please 
excuse me’) yields to the other and positive face (expectation of praise) asserts self 
over the other. The difficulty here is that rather than being a general theory of face, a 
thin aspect of face is used to develop a theory of communication. The point to be 
taken from this example is that face must be understood as something possessed by 
individuals and that is provided to them or taken from them by a complex of social 
interactions. Whether the face is positive or negative is not a matter of definition but 
arises from the interactions themselves. But what has been said here suggests that 
inherent in the distinction between positive and negative face is another distinction, 
between internal and external or subjective and objective aspects of face. 
The relationship between a person’s self image and their social standing in the 
formation of face is noted by a number of writers (Ho 1976: 803; Cheng 1986: 332). 
The subjective dimension of face is the value or self-regard of a person in their own 
estimation, in their self-esteem, as it relates to their social relationships and to society 
at large; while the objective dimension, on the other hand, is the social standing a 
person possess through the recognition they receive from others in the same society or 
from a specific person on a given occasion. Cheng (1986: 332), in particular, 
acknowledges the difference between how a person may imagine they are seen by 
others and how that person is actually seen by others. The question is not whether 
others view a person objectively in the sense of a clear, rational or even scientific 
appraisal but that the person is an ‘object’ of another’s appraisal as opposed to being 
the ‘subject’ of their own assessment.  
The distinction between subjective and objective aspects of face corresponds 
with accounts which regard face as the result of dual sources: ‘the evaluation of self 
based on internal and external (to the individual) judgments concerning a person’s 
adherence to moral rules of conduct and position within a given society’ (Earley 1997: 
43). On this basis face manifests two phases or parts: ‘[f]irst, there is a distinction 
between face tied to rules of conduct versus face as a position in a social hierarchy. 
Second, there is a distinction between the sources of these perceptions, namely, 
internal versus external reference’ (Earley 1997: 55). It is curious that Earley here 
confines considerations of face to ‘adherence to moral rules of conduct’ when social 
evaluation of all sorts of competences relating to diverse types of actions and events 
 can have consequences for loss – and gain – of face as we have seen above. But that 
matter aside, the distinction he draws between internal and external processes is 
continuous with the other distinctions referred to above.   
What emerges from the preceding discussion in this section and the previous is 
a more complete appreciation of the component parts and also the underlying 
processes of face which indicate the complexity of its referents to moral as well as 
social factors, to differences in the gravity of situations which provoke face 
considerations and also to the internal or psychological aspects of a person’s face as 
well as the more directly public or social appraisals productive of face. Thus a 
definition or understanding of face can be constructed which recognises the following 
elements that emerges from the critical analysis of the concept of face conducted 
through the preceding discussion.  
The first thing to notice is that face is always a self image. That self image can 
be conceptualised as having two inter-related forms: face is an image of self 
possessed by a person through their interest in how they are regarded or judged by 
others, and face is a social representation of a person reflecting the respect, regard or 
confidence others have in them. Secondly, the evaluations of self which are 
constitutive of a face state (the state of gaining, losing, recovering or maintaining face) 
are necessarily socially current and never personal or idiosyncratic, and therefore the 
evaluations leading to face function in terms of the self’s successful performance of 
actions socially understood as representing or reflecting those values (in the case of 
gaining, recovering and maintaining face) or unsuccessful performance, negligence or 
negation of those values as represented in actions or expressions of attitude (in the 
case of losing face). Third, the particular values salient for face can be moral, 
pragmatic or utilitarian, and social positional.  
It is important to emphasise that while the particular content of the values 
mentioned above is not fixed, and therefore that there is variation between different 
societies and through time in a single society, social values are the essential currency 
of face. Judgements of right and wrong, of capacities to perform skilled 
accomplishments and of social standing relative to others all relate to a sense of a 
person’s fulfilment of obligations to him or herself as a member of a social group and 
contributor to a social network and therefore also to the group or network itself. 
Finally, the idea that face is socially provided to persons or taken by them through the 
fulfilment of ‘obligations’ means that social judgements of a person’s performance 
against the values salient for face is always in terms of social expectations. The social 
approval and disapproval generative of face, then, has a continuously prospective 
element, connected with what is socially expected. Attributions of face are never fixed 
or static but dynamically subject to change both in terms of the individual’s behaviour 
and its social appraisal and also in terms of the values and expectations which govern 
those appraisals. 
What have not been identified in the definition of face set out above are the 
mechanisms that align a social evaluation of a person’s face with the self image 
possessed by the face ‘holder’. This is the question of the interaction between inner 
and outer processes, between a person’s own perception of his or her social self-image 
or face and the perception other people form of that person’s social ‘worth’ or 
‘standing’. When face is seen to be subject to not only external or social judgment but 
also to internal assessments, then the relevance of emotions becomes central to face 
considerations and to the internal mechanisms of face. 
 
Face and emotions 
 Face arises in social interactions or relationships which are in turn responsible 
for emotional experiences, and it is these latter that underlie the processes of face. The 
social basis of face provides it with contingent or conditional qualities which are 
experienced in terms of emotional feelings. The conditionality of face is captured in 
Goffman’s (1972: 10) statement that ‘while [a person’s] social face can be his most 
personal possession and the centre of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to 
him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is 
worthy of it’.  
Face is what a person feels about his or her image as it is seen through the 
eyes of others, of the person’s social group, community or a wider public. When a 
person sees his or her own image in this social ‘mirror’ constituted by others, as 
discussed above in the account of the ‘looking-glass’ self, that person’s emotional 
state will inevitably be affected by the vision their imagination presents and will be 
involved in the processes of feeling pride, embarrassment or whatever state the 
individual’s face is formed through and responds to. As Goffman (1972: 6) observes: 
‘a person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a 
contact with others allows him’.  
Face, therefore, is not to be detached or separated from emotion but, rather, 
face is infused with different emotions and exists in terms of them. As Jia (2001: 31) 
argues, ‘emotion intertwines and overlaps with lian/mianzi’. Viewing oneself through 
the eyes of others, one’s face may be enhanced (gain face), maintained (unchanged 
face), protected (saved face), or reduced (loss of face). In gaining face, persons 
experience feelings associated with pride, honour and dignity. When a person 
maintains his or her face, in Goffman’s (1972: 8) words is ‘in face’, then that person 
‘responds with feelings of confidence and assurance’. When a person saves his or her 
own face, which unlike the maintenance of face requires not merely social acceptance 
of a given state but the purposeful activity of the person directed to his or her 
presentation to others, that person is likely to feel a sense of relief and security. When 
a person loses face, or as Goffman (1972: 8) puts it, is ‘in wrong face or out of face’, 
then ‘he is likely’, Goffman continues, ‘to feel ashamed and inferior because of what 
has happened to the activity on his account and because of what may happen to his 
reputation as a participant’. Depending on the seriousness of the matter and a person’s 
perception and psychological bearing, the feelings that they will experience may 
range from embarrassment to shame, from incompetency to inferiority. There is 
confirmation of this perspective in the findings which Redding and Ng (1982: 215) 
report that strong feelings of pride, satisfaction, and confidence followed from gaining 
face while strong feelings of shame accompanied losing face.  
The emotional components of face are not simply a product or residue of 
experiences of face and changes in face, they are the drivers of the dynamic motion of 
the face states, including the gaining, losing, recovering and the maintaining of face. 
In social terms emotions arise out of the interactions between persons and in that 
sense are social products. Subjectively emotions give direction to and energise actions. 
The importance of emotions to face, then, is not simply that changes in face states 
produce emotional responses but in the fact that the particular emotions produced by 
different face states are the mechanisms that lead to the stabilization of or to changes 
in those face states. The feeling of shame, for instance, associated with the loss of face, 
provides its subject with a painful signal of the social disapproval of his or her 
transgression and motivates a withdrawal from the society of others. The shamed 
isolation of an individual is itself a penalty that brings with it various painful 
deprivations which motivate remorseful shame that signals to others the subject’s 
 recognition of his or her transgression and also the person’s sorrow about their 
previous behaviour and a desire to make amends. This is the beginning of recovering 
face and is facilitated by the emotional components of face. As a subjective 
experience, then, emotions are directed to not only internal feelings but also to 
particular ways of relating to and interacting with others. This is connected with a 
further aspect of face, namely, the way in which one person’s experience of face is 
supported and encouraged by their emotional feelings, and by feelings-related actions 
of others. 
 Since face is crucial to each person’s normal operation in their own social 
networks, a person is expected not only to look after their own face but also to 
maintain the face of others. There are frequently social obligations to give face, 
maintain and also save the face of another in order for a person to perform their own 
role or maintain their own position in their social circumstances and location. That is 
why a person also has ‘feelings about the face sustained for the other participants’, as 
Goffman (1972: 6) puts it. By enhancing the face of another, one may achieve a sense 
of power, fulfilment or joy depending on the relationship between the two persons and 
also possibly the motives of the face giver. By rescuing the face of another, one may 
have feelings of benevolence, or empathy or guiltlessness. There are two possible 
orientations, as Goffman points out: ‘a defensive orientation toward saving his own 
face and a protective orientation toward saving the others’ face’ (Goffman 1972: 14). 
A person’s achievement of face therefore involves not only what society provides to 
him or her but also what that person offers to others in society. Each of these is 
accomplished through the emotional experiences that social interaction conveys.  
 While most studies of face have confined themselves to the social production 
of an individual’s face, there is another side of face, then, in which a person’s face is 
also the consequence of what they provide to other members of society. This matter is 
less frequently discussed even though it is an essential aspect of face and one which is 
given greater relief in the context of a recognition that face functions in terms of 
emotional experiences, and of the reciprocal nature of emotions.  
 
The dual forms of face  
It can be seen from what has been shown above that face is a complex but efficient 
force of social control in social interactions, which includes incentives and sanctions 
enforced through both subjective and socially current perceptions and expectations. 
Individual experiences of face will necessarily be pleasurable or painful, depending 
on whether face is gained, say, or lost. The role of these and other emotional feelings 
is central to the way in which face, as a social force, promotes social conformity. 
Although he does not use the term face, Barbalet (2001: 108) finds these processes in 
Smith’s understanding that ‘social harmony and order are maintained, not by the 
subject’s feelings for others, but by the subject’s feelings concerning how they are 
regarded by others’. These mechanisms of face operate instantly, efficiently and 
automatically. In order to maintain face, a person will tend to represent themselves or 
behave in a way that leads to their social acceptance or respect. The positive or 
negative response from other members of a society toward that person then reinforces 
such behaviour and leads to continual and further conformity. When it encourages 
socially approved behaviour, then face enhances social harmony and stability. In this 
vein it has been suggested that in Chinese society concern for face similarly serves to 
‘regulate the perceived appropriate social behaviour of the Chinese, thus maintaining 
social harmony’ (Lau and Wong 2008: 53).  
 One of the problems with social conformity or harmony as a valued outcome 
of social relations, including those of face, is that the possible costs for not only 
individual independence but also for society as a whole, depend significantly on the 
specific content of the object or nature of what is conformed to. In a landmark social 
psychological study of conformity Asch,  reporting an experimental situation in which 
the majority of participants were instructed by the investigator to give completely 
erroneous responses to the subject of the experiment, found that ‘three-quarters of the 
subjects in the study were swayed at least once by the majority responses, only one 
quarter remained completely independent’ (quoted in Scheff 1988: 402). In discussing 
Asch’s conformity experiments Scheff (1988: 403) indicates that people find it 
extremely painful to perceive or imagine that they are negatively evaluated by others. 
When face leads to the approval of error (factual or moral), inappropriate or wrongful 
behaviour, vanity or the overvaluing of socially trivial characteristics such as celebrity 
or sporting success, and when face consideration rewards inconsequential or 
misguided achievements, then behaviour designed to maintain or achieve face can 
arguably be seen as a destructive force.  During the Cultural Revolution period (1966-
1976) in China, for instance, illiteracy was socially encouraged and education was 
condemned. Perhaps everyone in China at the time was familiar with the social praise 
of and the giving of face to Zhang Tiesheng for handing in a blank examination paper. 
In this way young people in China during the Cultural Revolution gained face by 
avoiding school, joining Hong Weibing (Red Guard) and tormenting and harassing 
distinguished intellectuals. In this instance face was part of the process which led the 
country to chaos and destroyed not only social justice but the best interests of 
countless young people. 
As a mechanism for the maintenance of social order, and especially 
conformity, the impact of face on a person and indeed on their society will be 
dependent on the nature of the social order to which conforming behaviour is 
orientated.  Face only entails the tendency to take pleasure in social approbation and 
to experience pain in meeting social disapproval or condemnation. At the same time, 
and through the same processes or mechanisms a person may feel that their own 
preferences or values are subverted in circumstances in which fear of loss of face, for 
example, leads to conforming on the grounds of a matter that independently of social 
approval may have been simply shrugged off or ignored. Under such conditions a 
face-focussed individual may jeopardise not only his or her normal social functioning 
but his or her own best interests and the interests of their associates. The question 
raised by these considerations is the possibility of the reification of face, the 
generation of face as a conscious project of social relations. 
It has been shown that face can be seen as a consequence or outcome of social 
interactions, encounters and relationships, and that face gives rise to emotions that are 
experienced as either pleasure or pain. It is possible, then, that face considerations 
may go beyond a mere mechanism associated with social approval and disapproval of 
the thing that gives rise to face or subtracts from it, and that face itself becomes an 
object of self-conscious consideration. It is possible, then, that persons may be 
engaged in the construction of face as a self-conscious project, not only to achieve the 
pleasure of social approval and avoid the pain of social disapproval or censure, but 
also to engage in a politics of face as an explicit social practice. Indeed, this may be a 
normal aspect of face under certain circumstances as when there is an absence in a 
society of other explicit bases of social control or conformity, such as law or 
organised religion that functions in terms of a sin-morality – neither of which has 
traditionally operated in China, for example. Under these circumstances face work 
 becomes more or less disengaged from the everyday and normal exchanges between 
individuals and becomes instead a matter of primary concern; rather than an effect of 
social interactions it becomes the purpose of social engagements. This is a second 
order of face when face becomes an explicit and conscious purpose of interaction 
rather than a means of interaction.  
What has been shown in the discussion above, however, is that in those 
societies in which face is an explicit object of social relations, rather than simply a 
means through which social relations are conducted, the processes involved are a 
highly visible form of those which govern the operations of a mere socially embedded 
from of face work, which both Smith and Cooley summarised in terms of a ‘looking 
glass’ self. 
 
Conclusion 
The significance of the argument above has been to indicate distinctions 
within face states, namely moral, pragmatic or utilitarian and positional valuations. 
Also, by distinguishing between external and internal processes of face, the 
importance of the integral connection between emotions and face has been 
highlighted. A further contribution of the paper is the distinction between face as an 
embedded social process and as an object of social contestation.  
The preceding discussion has clarified key elements of face, and the processes 
underlying it, by drawing upon, among other things, examination of the Chinese 
concept of face. The value of cultural borrowing in the development of social science 
has therefore been demonstrated in the generation in this paper of a comprehensive 
account of face. Indeed, by drawing upon the Chinese conception of face it is possible 
to discover details of the complexity of face, as the present paper has demonstrated.  
The significance of conceptual refinement for advancement of sociological 
theory is indicated in Merton’s classic discussion of the relationship between theory 
and empirical research in which the ‘basic requirement of research is that the concepts, 
the variables, be defined with sufficient clarity to enable the research to proceed’ 
(Merton 1968: 169). The task of conceptual refinement and innovation is necessary, 
according to Merton, to identify and understand previously neglected objects and 
relationships and thereby advance social theory (Merton 1968: 146-7). One source of 
conceptual development in a globalized world, as Goffman hinted, can be cross-
cultural. Underlying the discussion of face in the present paper, therefore, is a 
demonstration of a more general point concerning the development of sociological 
theory by introducing, in this case, Chinese concepts.  
The origin of social science in European and North American historical 
experiences has not inhibited its universalistic pretensions (Connell 2006). It is 
frequently mentioned that the application of Western social science to non-Western 
societies is either exploitative, with the non-Western case simply mined for data, or 
generative of flawed description or theory (Hamilton 2006: 50-74, 220-36). One 
possible response to the asymmetrical ‘theory flow’, from the metropole to the 
periphery (Appadurai 2001; Castells 1996; Hannerz 2008), practised in the present 
paper, is to incorporate into standard or Western social theory concepts drawn from 
non-Western cultures and fashioned through non-Western, in this case Chinese 
experiences. Not only does this go toward redressing the imbalance, it also enriches 
sociological theory in general, and in particular, the theory of face. 
 
Note: 
 ¹ Relative to its importance in Chinese social relations there are surprisingly few 
sociological discussions of face in Chinese sources. One obvious explanation is that 
face is so basic to social relations between Chinese persons that it is simply taken for 
granted and has failed to attract Chinese sociological investigation. While this is no 
doubt true, it is also important to note that sociology was first introduced into China in 
the early 20th century by American missionary sociologists, bringing with them 
American textbooks and pursuing American research interests in which face and 
related characteristically Chinese elements had no place (Wong 1979: 11-19). When 
sociology underwent sinicisation, from the 1930s, it was directed to the study of 
minorities, agrarian class structure and issues of structural change (Wong 1979: 19-36) 
and again the topic of face draw no sociological attention. Only when Chinese writers 
attempted to explain Chinese society to foreigners did face become a research theme, 
and then the discussion of face by Chinese sociologists (Hu 1944; Ho 1976; Hsu 1996; 
Hwang 1987a; Jia 2001) and social commentators (Lin 1936: 186-93) was in English. 
More recently, since China has ‘opened its doors’ there has risen in China and in 
Taiwan an interest in comparing Chinese and non-Chinese societies, face has become 
a topic about which there is Chinese-language discussion among Chinese sociologists 
and especially psychologists (Hwang 1987a; Hwang 1987b; Lu 1996; Zhai 1994; Zhai 
1995: Zuo 1997). It is interesting in this context to notice that Ho later published a 
Chinese version of his (1976) paper in a book (Ho, Peng and Zhao 2006), and 
similarly Hwang’s (1987a) paper was simultaneously published in Chinese (Hwang 
1987b). 
 
References: 
Appadurai, A. (2001) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Barbalet, J. M. (2001) Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure: A 
Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Brown, P. and Levinson, S. (1987) Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buckley, P., Clegg, J. and Tan, H. (2006) ‘Cultural Awareness in Knowledge Transfer 
to China – The Role of Guanxi and Mianzi’, Journal of World Business 41: 275-
88. 
Cardon, P. and Scott, J. (2003) ‘Chinese Business Face: Communication Behaviours 
and Teaching Approaches’, Business Communication Quarterly 66: 9-22. 
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Cheng, C. (1986) ‘The Concept of Face and its Confucian Roots’, Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 13: 329-48. 
Connell, R. (2006) ‘Northern Theory: The Political Geography of General Social 
Theory’. Theory and Society 35(2): 237-64. 
Connell, R. (2007) Southern Theory: A Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social 
Science. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. 
Cooley, C.H. (1964) Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken 
Books. 
Dougherty, T.W. and Wall, J.A. (1991) ‘Teaching in China During the Age of 
Reform’, Journal of Management Education 15: 232-43. 
Earley, P. (1997) Face, Harmony, and Social Structure: An Analysis of Organisational 
Behaviour across Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Goffman, E. (1972) ‘On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social 
Interaction’, pp. 5-46 in E. Goffman (ed.) Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-
face Behaviour. London: The Penguin Press. 
Hamilton, G.G. (2006) Commerce and Capitalism in Chinese Societies. London: 
Routledge.  
Hannerz, U. (2008) ‘The Global Ecumene’. Pp. 105-16 in F.J. Lechner and J. Boli 
(eds.) The Globalization Reader. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.  
Ho, D. (1976) ‘On the Concept of Face’, American Journal of Sociology 81: 867-84. 
Ho, D., Peng, S. and Zhao, Z. (2006) Shidao Renxin: Dui Zhongguoren Xinli de 
Tansuo [The Manners and Morals of the Time and Human Psychology: An 
Exploration of Chinese Psychology]. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing. 
Hsu, C. S. (1996) ‘Face’: An Ethnographic Study of Chinese Social Behaviour. Ann 
Arbor: UMI.  
Hu, H. (1944) ‘The Chinese Concepts of  “Face”’, American Anthropologist 46: 45-
64. 
Hwang, A., Ang, S. and Francesco, A. (2002) ‘The Silent Chinese: The Influence of 
Face and Kiasuism on Student Feedback-Seeking Behaviours’, Journal of 
Management Education 26: 70-98. 
Hwang, A., Francesco, A. and Kesslear, E. (2003) ‘The Relationship between 
Individualism-collectivism, Face, and Feedback and Learning Processes in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States’, Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 34: 72-91. 
Hwang, K. (1987a) ‘Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game’, The American 
Journal of Sociology 92(4): 944-74. 
Hwang， K. (1987b) Renqing yu Mianzi – Zhonguoren de Quanli Youxi [Favor and 
Face – The Chinese Power Game]. Taipei: Juliu Books Company.  
Jia, W. (2001) The Remaking of the Chinese Character and Identity in the 21st 
Century: The Chinese Face Practices. Westport, CT: Ablex. 
Lau, Y. and Wong, D. (2008) ‘Are Concern for Face and Willingness to Seek Help 
Correlated to Early Postnatal Depressive Symptoms among Hong Kong Chinese 
women? A Cross-sectional Questionnaire Survey’, International Journal of 
Nursing Studies 45: 51-64. 
Lin, Y. (1936) My Country and My People. Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational 
Books. 
Lu, Z. (1996) (ed.) Zhongguoren de Chuantong Xintai [The Traditional Psychology of 
Chinese People]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press. 
Merton, R. K. (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. 
Redding, S. G. and Ng, M. (1982) ‘The Role of Face in the Organisational 
Perceptions of Chinese Managers’, Organisation Studies 3: 210-19. 
Scheff, T. J. (1988) ‘Shame and Conformity: The Deference-emotion System’, 
American Sociological Review 53: 395-406. 
Wong, S. (1979) Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary China. London: 
Routledge. 
Zhai, X. (1994) Mianzi, Renqing, and Guanxi Wang [Face, Favour and Guanxi 
Network]. Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press. 
Zhai, X. (1995) Zhongguoren de Lianmian Guan [The Chinese Perspective on Face]. 
Taipei: Guiguan Press.  
Zhu, H. (2003) ‘Looking for Face’, Journal of Asian Pacific Communication 13: 313-
21. 
 
 Zuo, B. (1997) Zhongguoren de Lian yu Mianzi [Face among the Chinese People]. 
Hubei: Central China Normal University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
